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Introduction  
There are many illustrations from recent history of what we now call science diplomacy; for example, 
where nations have advanced scientific collaboration to build relationships and smooth hostilities in 
the period post World War II. However, compared to other fields such as cultural diplomacy, 
academics and policy makers have only recently begun to investigate and develop frameworks and 
tools for ‘science diplomacy’. We are still in the process of testing the limits of the concept, which can 
most readily be explained as actions that exist at the interface of scientific practice and foreign policy. 
Science is often considered alongside culture as a tool of soft power (Nye, 1990) but there are several 
critical differences between the two fields and they should not be given a false equivalence as a 
diplomatic tool. Cultural practice and knowledge are by their very nature fundamentally linked to a 
particular nation or group; it can be shared without diminution in value and is very difficult to lose. 
Science knowledge and practices on the other hand, can be transferred, sold or stolen, and used for 
the economic benefit or advancement of others. Intellectual property has independent economic 
value and must be protected; its loss can diminish competitiveness, influence and lead to conflict 
between states (as we see in contemporary US, China relations). Its application leads to tradeable 
technology and goods and hard economic advantage. Taking liberties with Nye’s (1990) classic 
terminology, if cultural diplomacy is the runny egg of soft power, then scientific diplomacy is much 
harder boiled.  
The first broadly accepted taxonomy for science diplomacy was proposed in 2009 by the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science and the British Royal Society; “science in diplomacy”, 
“diplomacy for science” and “science for diplomacy” (Royal Society, 2010). Recently this taxonomy 
has been contested as primarily useful for academic and theoretical discussion and potentially 
limiting in understanding the evolving and multifaceted practice of science diplomacy. Writing as 
practitioners of science diplomacy, Gluckman et al. (2017) propose a more outcome-oriented framing; 
- Actions designed to directly advance a country’s national needs 
- Actions designed to address cross border interests 
- Actions primarily designed to meet global needs and challenges. 
This reframing to focus on specific objectives has proved helpful when considering the practical 
implications for science and is consistent with the Commission’s continued refinement of the 
framework programmes towards a mission focus. Nevertheless, despite increased political will and 
attention to the topic, the extent to which ‘science diplomacy’ is a concept understood by the 
scientists leading major international collaborations remains unclear. Science diplomacy may be easy 
to spot in the rear-view mirror, but without engagement of the scientific community, how to harness 
its potential for the future becomes the key policy question for the future. 
Today, European funding programmes and international collaboration are for many scientists nothing 
to get excited about. Indeed, the Commission’s first framework programme was established nearly 40 
years ago. A generation commenced their careers in an environment where European collaboration is 
the norm, rather than the exception and where international networks are established early, through 
an Erasmus or other exchange program. This is evidence of successful science diplomacy, but it 
should not be assumed its effectiveness is understood by all beneficiaries. This study investigates 
whether, and to what extent, science diplomacy is understood within the European scientific 
community and explores the potential for this community to have an active role in furthering the EU’s 
diplomatic objectives.  
Research for this paper focused on the community of Horizon 2020 project and scientific 
coordinators. Horizon 2020 is a critical investment in EU science and innovation, its reach and impact 
clearly extending to the fields of international relations and diplomacy. With this in mind, the study 
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aims to determine in practical terms how scientists leading H2020 science projects understand and 
engage with the concept of 'science diplomacy'. Including; 
- Overall level of familiarity with the concept and attributes of science diplomacy 
- How (consciously or not) science diplomacy intersects with the project and their 
responsibilities 
- Challenges and barriers to H2020 projects reaching their full diplomatic potential. 
 
These results will inform how to manage and deliver the expectations and aspirations of EU and 
member state stakeholders in H2020 science projects and deliver broader learning relevant to the 
practice of science diplomacy. 
This report is divided into four parts. First, it outlines the methodology and approach, part two 
discusses the key findings and identify some general themes relevant to science diplomacy. The third 
part undertakes the analysis of these findings and part four provides some recommendations for the 
activation of science diplomacy within the science community.  
Methodology and Approach 
The approach was framed by two assumptions; first, that most coordinators would be unfamiliar with 
the concepts of science diplomacy and second, they would be focused on scientific deliverables 
rather than any diplomatic implications for their projects. From this starting point, we sought evidence 
of scientific diplomacy amongst the H2020 community.  
The initial proposal was for a three-stage qualitative and quantitative research process, the core of 
which was a broad quantitative evaluation of coordinators across the H2020 program. Unfortunately, 
for privacy reasons, coordinator contact details were not released by the Commission. As there are 
currently well over 10,000 active projects being undertaken within the H2020 framework, manual 
gathering of this information made the logistics of a broad-based quantitative study unfeasible. 
Accordingly, the methodology was adapted to focus on an in depth qualitative investigation.  
Sixteen semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with H2020 coordinators, between 
February and April 2018. Each interview was approximately one hour in duration, allowing a 
substantial discussion pertinent to the research topic. In selecting project coordinators to approach 
for an interview, the following criteria were applied: 
- A topic with implications and applications beyond the EU 
- A broad consortium, ideally with country participation beyond the EU  
- The deliverables include scientific or technical outcomes  
- Commencement date prior to 1 June 2017 
- A significant investment in EU funds (over 2 million Euros) 
 
These criteria were intended to direct us to projects where it was relatively more likely (and possibly 
necessary) that an understanding or practice of science as a diplomatic tool would exist.  
It is perhaps useful to clarify what is meant by the term ‘science’ for the purpose of this study. A 
spectrum of scientific activity exists from basic science to market readiness, and at a certain point 
that activity could be called innovation. For those engaged in basic materials science, for example, 
the impact of their research may not be seen in society for decades. Indeed, the applications 
envisaged today may be entirely different to what is ultimately delivered to market. But as we 
approach market or societal application, the projects engage very different stakeholders and raise 
new diplomatic issues and opportunities, many aligned with economic and trade interests. This study 
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considers projects across this spectrum, with its focus being the scientist, rather than the project 
output. 
Sample Characteristics  
The intention of this study was to reach projects covering a range of research fields and technical 
readiness levels (TRL), to avoid either of these factors becoming sources of bias. A good diversity of 
projects was achieved. 
As might be expected given the nature of the H2020 program, the project coordinators interviewed 
are leading diverse, often multi-sector, multi-disciplinary consortia. They represent academic 
institutions, public/private networks, research institutes and government bodies. The study 
endeavored to keep geographic scope broad, while acknowledging a bias towards Belgian based 
coordinators, representing approximately forty percent of the sample. Although the sample is not 
large enough to validate this finding, there was no indication that geographical location of the 
coordinator was a significant influencer of attitudes compared to other variables, for example, project 
TRL, or the coordinator’s career stage. 
Discussion Framework 
As each of the coordinators and projects presented a specific insight into the topic, the interviews 
were conducted in a semi-structured format, that generally aligned to the following framework.  
 
 
 
It was considered important however, not to be too prescriptive about science diplomacy (lacking a 
precise definition in any case), rather, to elicit the scientists’ own interpretation in the first instance 
and then make an assessment from the broader conversation of any evidence of science diplomacy 
proper. As expected, the attitudes and examples of activities that were shared in general discussion 
about the project or in the context of international science collaborations generally, were often more 
revealing than answers to direct questions.  
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Findings 
Stage 1 - Understanding of “Science Diplomacy” 
Coordinators were asked to assess his or her understanding of the term and then describe it in their 
own words. Each interviewee knew the topic of the conversation would be about science diplomacy 
but as little background as possible was given, hoping to gain an unprompted reaction to the 
terminology and ideas.  
The academic or policy language of science diplomacy was not generally familiar to the coordinators, 
even for those operating in the cross hairs of international engagement at government and policy 
level. The first reaction in most cases, was to think about relationships between academic, research 
and industry bodies, rather than to place it in a government or national context. On the other hand, the 
attributes of science that create the potential for diplomatic impact are well understood.  
It was interesting to note that self-assessment 
proved very unreliable. Over half of those who 
claimed no familiarity with science diplomacy 
demonstrated a good understanding of its core 
concepts, and some were actively networked into 
national and international policy groups.  
Although this test requires a broader sample to 
draw any firm conclusions, it is of note that contrary 
to the starting assumptions, the majority of 
coordinators did articulate an understanding of 
science diplomacy and/or gave examples that demonstrated understanding of core concepts, in the 
context of advancing EU or national interests. 
Stage 2 – Response to Potential Attributes of Science Diplomacy 
As a prompt for further discussion, reactions were sought to five descriptions that might be 
considered aspects of science diplomacy.  
1. Improving international relationships at government level, through scientific collaboration 
Most coordinators’ first reaction was positive, but in a general context of improving relationships, 
scientific, academic or societal, rather than specifically ‘at government level’. On further discussion, 
however most understood the distinction and agreed with this statement as a description of science 
diplomacy. One spoke of his project increasing collaboration between nations in the Mediterranean 
Basin; “science can help to overcome political frictions, in scientific research there are no regions, just 
one problem, one solution” (Coordinator, Italy). 
For others a government focus was specifically rejected. There were two issues; first, a belief that 
international scientific collaboration is now ‘just science’ and with the exception of funding, does not 
imply government engagement, and second, science improving international relationships at 
government level simply feels too ambitious, particularly for their projects.  
2. Building international scientific relationships for skills transfer and capability development 
There was broad agreement that skills transfer and capability development is fundamental to 
international scientific collaboration and essential for the advancement of science. The group was 
evenly split however, on whether this activity should be described as science diplomacy. The issue 
for many was as one said, “you can call it diplomatic, but for most scientists it’s just part of their job.” 
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Diplomatic impact may be incidental, but not an objective, and most saw the role of government in 
this area as a funding source, essential to stimulate opportunities. 
For those who understood the diplomatic potential, examples included science mobility for EU 
cohesion, and creating a ‘level playing field’ for science. Some also saw in their projects, and from 
past experiences, the potential to address social problems and increase EU influence in 
neighbourhood countries through capability building.  
3. Disseminating scientific knowledge and applications beyond borders 
Similar to the previous statement regarding skills and capability, dissemination is regarded primarily 
as an activity fundamental to the scientific role. Whether it might also be a diplomatic activity was a 
question that divided the group. In making any assessment, it is important to consider the context, 
and the level that the dissemination is occurring. Most did not consider this to be a diplomatic activity, 
however many mentioned the role of dissemination in increasing EU competitiveness and 
strengthening international relationships through shared data and common applications.  
 
4. Using science to engage in problem solving at global level 
There was widespread support for this description of science diplomacy. The need for science and 
governments to work together to solve global problems was explicitly recognised by many 
coordinators. One coordinator did not agree with the categorisation of ‘science diplomacy’, however 
gave as justification identical reasoning; that science can contribute, but only by political will can 
global problems be solved. 
 
Not all were aware of the proposed mission-oriented thinking for research and innovation1 as a 
framework for future EU funding programs, however the response was generally supportive, that this 
is a positive direction for the EU. Some concerns were raised, the importance of maintaining 
investment in blue-sky research being the primary issue. 
 
5. Using scientific projects or outcomes, to achieve a foreign policy objective of the EU, or your country. 
This was identified by most as the closest to a classic description of science diplomacy. It was also 
recognised by many of the coordinators that their projects serve or are aligned to EU policy objectives. 
But of all the descriptions this evoked the most negative responses, with some coordinators rejecting 
any implication that science might be politically directed, rather than motivated by the unbiased 
scientific enquiry and/or achieving a societal benefit.  
This ‘ethos of science’ if you like, was a recurring theme through many of the interviews. The neutrality 
of science is fundamental to its potential for diplomatic impact, and we will explore this further in the 
analysis section. 
Stage 3 - H2020 as a Diplomatic Initiative of the EU 
Unsurprisingly, given the need for geographic diversity in projects, most coordinators consider the 
H2020 programme to be both a scientific and diplomatic initiative. The consortium requirement was 
most often cited, along with the goals of EU cohesion and advancing EU competitiveness. 
Notwithstanding the diplomatic and cohesion benefits delivered by a multi-member consortium, it 
was clear that in practice, scientific and operational needs take precedence when assembling 
collaborating partners and, in many cases, consortia were built from existing scientific networks and 
                                                            
 
1 As proposed by Mariana Mazzucato in Mission-Oriented Research & Innovation in the European Union: A problem-solving 
approach to fuel innovation-led growth.  
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relationships. That is not to say that geographic diversity was considered merely a bureaucratic 
requirement. For most coordinators it was an important part of the program;  
I really believe more and more, that the geographic solution must be relevant, not only to make 
the EU economy more competitive, but also to create Europe. (Coordinator, Italy) 
Most of those expressing a view considered that in an international context, H2020 enhances the 
reputation and influence of the EU. The level of investment and the programme’s reputation for 
scientific excellence were considered of major impact, in general, there was agreement that H2020 
‘puts the EU on the global stage’. Of those who were not convinced, the view was rather that H2020 is 
not unique, but as one UK coordinator stated, “just another big funding programme”. 
A better understanding of the external diplomatic impact of the H2020 programme emerged from 
general project discussion with those coordinators working with partners external to the EU, in South 
America, Africa and the Mediterranean Basin. They collectively demonstrate a sophisticated approach 
to engagement with local issues, a consciousness of mistrust derived from colonial practices (and 
more recent exploitations) and a focus on capability building and collaboration rather than imposition 
of solutions; “we are coming as equal partners, not as funders, or doers, or heroes from the EU” 
(Coordinator, Sweden). There is an awareness, gained through experience, that EU objectives are 
sometimes not aligned with local priorities and must be managed; “we think we know, because we 
can control it in Europe, but maybe we are not talking to the people on the ground, they are having 
other problems” (Coordinator, Belgium). 
It is reported that the EU teams, in comparison to other nations have developed trustful and productive 
relationships with this positive impression flowing upwards; in one coordinator’s words, “[The project] 
has so much visibility… Governors will be there, politicians and VIPS will be there to welcome us.” This 
success is attributed by the coordinator to a framework that rewards collaboration and encourages 
networks, as part of the scientific programme. 
Understanding that H2020 has a diplomatic agenda however, does not translate to coordinators 
identifying themselves as acting in a representative, or diplomatic capacity. Despite his engagement 
in international policy making, one coordinator commented, “I’ve never considered myself a science 
diplomat, I’m not even sure what that means… I want to do actionable science” (Coordinator, 
Germany). 
Many felt the description ‘science diplomat’ was simply inaccurate for the coordinator role, a 
misalignment of capabilities, responsibilities. Some acknowledged that while their participation at 
global conferences or summits could place them in a representative capacity, this activity was not 
generally considered ‘diplomatic’. A number observed that role of H2020 coordinator is one of 
influence and coordination rather than direction, and thus the role functions ‘diplomatically’ vis a vis 
project partners and external stakeholders. It is important however, to make the distinction between 
working in a diplomatic manner, versus functioning as a diplomat. 
For the few who identified as a ‘science diplomats’ or as having acted in a diplomatic capacity, this 
was not in their role as H2020 Coordinator, but through for example, participation in international 
networks or policy groups, UN authorities, or if specifically asked to represent EU science in an 
international forum. 
Overall and in the hypothetical, there was a more positive response to the title ‘science diplomat’ than 
was anticipated at the time of writing the EL CSID application in 2015. Only a third considered it to 
carry a negative connotation. These varied in the detail, but most shared a general concern, that it 
implies an agenda that is not necessarily ‘science first’.  
I prefer to see diplomacy as a by-product that comes naturally, rather than to be my 
deliverable… engaging with political stakeholders could be one of my deliverables and that 
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would be very good but hide the word diplomacy because it has it own purpose. The primary 
product is your science. (Coordinator, Sweden) 
As we discuss in detail in the analysis, most crucial is the question of function and capability. Whether 
it is possible, or desirable for scientists leading H2020 projects, or indeed any scientist leading an 
international project, to take on a diplomatic role.  
Stage 4 – Policy Involvement and Familiarity with Relevant Foreign Policies 
Due to the nature of the projects, most of the coordinators we interviewed are working within a 
complex policy environment, some relevant to international relations, but also at local and industry 
level. Many projects included contribution to policy as a specific deliverable.  
 
Engaging with Policy as H2020 Coordinator 
Half of all coordinators judged that their role required actively engaging, or seeking engagement, with 
policy makers. For some this was an explicit requirement of the Call, others understood it as a 
necessary step to ensure impact of their project results. For all, the priority is to provide unbiased, 
evidence-based advice; “As a science, we don’t enact policy… it needs to be quite separate. I provide 
advice and it is unbiased advice.” (Coordinator, Germany) The nature and level of the policy forum 
varied, from contributing to international bodies, on global issues such as climate and food security, 
to internal policies designed to enhance EU competitiveness. 
 
Other coordinators are less connected to policy making; they understand and navigate their projects 
through the policy environment, but do not have, or seek, a role in influencing it. One coordinator 
leading a technology driven agricultural project, spoke of hopes for a more optimised regulatory 
environment, but commented “we have no power to change such policies… we don’t interfere”.  
 
It seems that the path to policy engagement is not always clear, even when coordinators recognise it 
is important for their project. A number reported frustrations navigating the DG environment and, in a 
few cases, struggled even to connect with their project’s designated project officer.  
 
Familiarity with National or EU Foreign Policy Objectives 
A broad diplomatic agenda of EU cohesion and EU competitiveness may be understood by most, but 
very few coordinators could identify an agenda or specific objectives, relevant to their projects, either 
in relation to the EU or the consortium countries.  
After attempting to discuss their national science policies with the coordinators, it was clear that there 
was little perceived connection between their work in H2020 projects and furthering a national foreign 
or science policy. Coordinators from Germany, Switzerland and the UK were aware of investment in 
national science infrastructure and an agenda for competitiveness in the knowledge industries. 
Beyond this, the groups understanding of any national agenda for science was very limited. 
There appears to be is a corresponding lack of awareness by national governments of their country’s 
participation in H2020 projects, or the level of scientific work being done. In one example;  
“The Minister for Foreign Affairs had to organise a meeting [at the G7] concerning 
biosecurity… they didn’t know we have been working on this topic for fifteen years. The 
Canadian delegation told them… do you know you have a group with a lot of expertise, they 
are recognised and have coordinated many projects? Then they called us.” (Coordinator, Italy) 
 
There is significantly more familiarity with the EU’s policy objectives, given the three pillars of the 
H2020 framework. The Call is the most significant source of specific information about EU objectives 
and coordinators have taken their policy cues from that document. The call was usually referenced 
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by those claiming an understanding of EU policy in connection with their project. If the call is not 
explicit about any diplomatic agenda however, priority and focus are understandably given to the 
projects’ sizeable scientific deliverables. Only a few coordinators reported receiving additional 
information, from workshops or meetings hosted by the relevant DG, and one coordinator drew a more 
general policy context, via his involvement in international bodies.  
 
Overall, the responses vary widely, a significant proportion of the group sees their project almost 
exclusively in terms of its science and technical deliverables. On the other hand, it is clear from our 
discussions that some coordinators, particularly the more senior scientists, readily understand and 
engage with the diplomatic and policy implications of their project, even if this is not language they 
would use to describe it.  
Stage 5 – Issues and Barriers to Scientists Working in a Diplomatic Capacity 
It seems that leading a H2020 project does not leave much spare time for musing whether there is a 
diplomatic opportunity in parallel with the project’s hard scientific deliverables. Neither do the 
interviews suggest that scientists are generally given to such musings. But overall, they are more 
receptive than initially anticipated to the purpose and value of science diplomacy, even as they remind 
us that they are not diplomats and that the skill sets are vastly different. Many commented on a need 
for better understanding of cultural issues and political sensitivities beyond (or within) the EU.  
Lack of clarity of diplomatic context or agenda is an issue, but rarely is further information available 
beyond the call. Scientists will not often infer a broader agenda than the scientific deliverables unless 
explicitly stated (and funding allocated). Some specifically commented on the ‘woolly’ or ‘fuzzy’ nature 
of diplomacy and the need for hard deliverables to bring the subject into focus.  
“I’ve never seen any opportunity provided by the Commission to say well you guys are 
interested in foreign affairs, relationships or international policies, or how your project might 
interact with the policy elements, and sometimes I wish there’d been something like that 
because I know some of my colleagues don’t have that exposure and at times make 
suboptimal decisions just because they’re not aware.” (Coordinator, Germany) 
Bureaucratic challenge is also an issue. A number of difficulties were reported at the interface of the 
project and the Commission; opaqueness of policy influencing process, access to the correct 
commission officers, perceived lack of communication and coordination between DGs, a sense of 
helplessness in the face of the ‘black box’.  
It’s quite a challenge to winkle out from them, from the vast DG, who we speak to, how we do 
this. We are meant to have a policy officer, this person hasn’t…we’ve had no contact from 
these people... (Coordinator, UK)  
It is a challenge working in a DG environment finding someone who is connected, who can act 
as information broker. It seems such a bottom up approach for a coordinator like myself to 
have to get in a room with [various DGs] who never speak to each other… I feel like there’s 
some missed opportunities here. (Coordinator, Germany)  
The priority expressed by many was that science has impact, is actionable, and it is generally 
understood that diplomatic and political efforts are integral to this, even if it is simply for establishing 
funding or infrastructure. The challenge for scientists unfamiliar with a policy environment is lack of 
support, or access to policy making. 
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General Themes 
The attributes of science that underly its potential in diplomatic relations were well known; for 
example, that science is borderless and that common problem-solving leaves political conflicts at the 
door. These and more examples, were regularly mentioned during discussion. 
 
“When you talk about science there are no more barriers and I believe researchers are the 
best, or among the best people to make connections between countries having problems, 
political problems or other problems.” (Coordinator, Italy) 
 
Other general themes emerged, that shape the overall attitudes and perceptions of science diplomacy 
in this community. They can be categorised as; the changing practice of science due to globalisation; 
the importance of maintaining neutrality and credibility; and the challenges for science to 
communicate effectively. 
The Globalisation of Science.  
Today like many industries, science is conducted on a global basis; international collaboration is 
common and leads to widespread dissemination and applications. Scientific groups are increasingly 
focused on an operating model of ‘specialise and connect’, given the diversity of skills, techniques 
and approaches required. Such connections arise though membership of disciplinary bodies, 
workshops, conferences, travel and exchange programs.  
“Now you have 10, 15, 20 people [as authors of a paper] and each contribute something 
important. It’s globalisation; the way we can address a single question and its very rare that 
a single lab can master all the technique, all the approaches, so you have to collaborate. 
Science is changing, the way we do science is very different now.” (Coordinator, Switzerland) 
Transdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approaches are becoming essential as problems become 
more complex. Industry is increasingly engaged; making and funding calls, cooperating in pre-
competitive basic science. Industry also poses a threat; in the data/technology space EU science 
must address the impact of GAFA (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon). 
The Essential Neutrality of Science 
There is a pragmatic understanding that governments and policy makers will, and must, be involved 
in science. But there is much suspicion of the short termism and political gain seeking of 
governments. In general, most were comfortable knowing that their project is aligned with policy, as 
long as it is not directed by policy. Even when positive examples are given (such as a govt program to 
cure disease/to address climate change) many felt it important that the scientists themselves are 
motivated solely by the societal benefits. 
Collectively, a set of ‘scientific ideals’ emerged from the interviews -  
- Science should be for the benefit of society.  
- Scientific collaboration is problem focused and neutral; without regard to nationality, religion, 
politics of the collaborators  
- Scientific knowledge should be open and disseminated broadly, in particular where it has been 
gained through public money. 
- Even though some problems cannot be solved without government, or engagement of policy 
makers, the scientific work must not be directed by government.  
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The Communication and Credibility of Science 
The communication challenge has two aspects; firstly, how to deal with the public perception of 
science and the broad dissemination of scientific knowledge, secondly is how to communicate most 
effectively with policy makers and government. 
Of common concern was the diminishing trust of science by segments of society. It is widely felt that 
vis a vis the public, there is a need for science to better represent itself, to communicate in appropriate 
language, and to champion an evidence-based approach to problem solving. Recurring issues 
included; 
- The difficulty with conveying complexity to a public or political audience 
- Not understanding the end user/public priorities and thus being unable to convey what is 
most important and useful. 
- Misunderstanding of the scientific practice of peer challenge and review, leading to a 
misconception that science findings are just a matter of opinion (and/or all opinions equally 
valid) 
- Misinformation - mainstream media (most useful sound bites), social media (sharing false or 
disproved science, for example, as has occurred leading to vaccine hesitancy) 
Communication challenges flowed over into dealing with policy and government stakeholders. Many 
noted that the time frame for science, particularly blue-sky science, was at odds with that of politics 
(vote seeking) and industry (profit seeking). It was felt by some that this contributed to a lack of 
political will to argue for the potential unpopular, even when the science clearly supports new policy 
(eg the potential value of genetic modification versus the public reluctance.). Others identified the gap 
between popular political objectives and scientific feasibility, and how to “say things that are true, 
even if they are not popular in Brussels.” (Coordinator, Czech Republic) 
Discussion and Analysis 
Speaking at the European Research Council in 20162, Commissioner Carlos Moedas said, “science 
has become so advanced and complex that no single individual can expect to produce major 
breakthroughs alone – even in that most solitary of sciences, mathematics”. He made this comment 
in support of his argument that science is a critical tool for modern diplomacy. This observation 
however, also aligns with the finding that international collaboration and borderless working is simply 
modern science. It is important to avoid attributing too much to the mere fact of international 
collaboration, when it is vastly more common for it to occur without a specific diplomatic outcome or 
purpose. If not, as Van Langenhove (2017) warns, we risk overstretching the concept so much that 
we render it meaningless.  
International science as undertaken today within the H2020 framework involves a multiplicity of 
actors, stakeholders, and end-users, working both inside and external to project consortia. The 
projects contain a multitude of work packages and deliverables, often across disciplines and TRLs. In 
such a complex environment, bringing a potential diplomatic component into focus is not always easy, 
especially when looking ‘bottom up’ from the scientists’ perspective.  
                                                            
 
2 Science diplomacy as a driver of excellence, full speech available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/moedas/announcements/science-diplomacy-driver-
excellence_en 
 
12 
Ruffini (2017, p8) poses a number of questions, amongst them and most relevant for this study, “Are 
scientists good ambassadors for their country?” and “Does science diplomacy threaten the 
independence of the researcher?” In subsequent discussion, he contrasts the impartiality and the 
search for truth embedded in the scientific ideal, with the politically motivated and not always 
forthright practices of the professional diplomat, but “while we start from a point where there is strong 
contrast and well entrenched position prevail, these differences are becoming smaller in the 
momentum of action.” (Ruffini, p30). This aligns with the findings of this study - the suspicions 
encountered around short term political thinking and misaligned priorities do exist but are 
accompanied by considerable willingness from scientists to engage with the diplomatic agenda. 
Many understand the reality that science may need to operate in a political environment to achieve 
impact.  
This willingness is not unconditional however, scientists must work with ‘clean hands’ to retain 
credibility, they are highly protective of their role as unbiased advisors and are motivated by increasing 
scientific impact and actionable results. And willingness alone is not sufficient, a gap remains, namely 
the means or skills to appropriately engage, or to put it into Van Langenhove’s terms (2017), there is 
willingness, but not capacity. In this case we must return to the importance of the call.  
The more context and clarity that can be brought to the call, its overall contribution to the ‘bigger 
picture’, and thus the project design, the better equipped that scientists leading these projects will be 
to achieve the broadest possible impact of their science. And because coordinators are minutely 
aware of the terms of the call and understand that precisely meeting all aspects it is a requirement 
for securing an award, it is possible to encourage even those who are less attuned to diplomatic 
possibilities.  
“You can’t make scientists politicians, they’re not, but the call will drive the scientists to do 
some things… so I think ensuring policy issues are part of the call and there is money for 
meetings, international meetings.” (Coordinator, Sweden) 
Yet, it should not be assumed that scientists, even given context and opportunity can deliver a 
diplomatic outcome. As Flink and Schreiterer (2010) note, ‘it is crucial to get the right people to the 
job, be they career diplomats who are familiar with S&T, or S&T professionals who command excellent 
personal skills and political judgement.” Many senior scientists have developed skills, through 
interest, talent or necessity that enable them, by their own account, to function at a high level of 
engagement and influencing, however this will not always be the case. Of course, the need for 
diplomatic skills is project dependent and in the majority of projects the soft benefit of enhanced 
international relations through scientific collaboration and capacity building does not necessarily 
require, or benefit from, an explicit understanding by the participants of the diplomatic value of their 
work.  
This leads to another key question; to what extent can, or should we engage scientists in science 
diplomacy as a forward directed tool? This is a far bigger question than this study can address in 
depth, but the research does suggest that forward momentum is achieved by scientists informing and 
influencing policy, rather than working at the its behest. Any suggestion of direction by political 
agenda is to be avoided, and indeed appears unnecessary if the objectives are framed correctly. As 
was identified during the self-evaluation of diplomatic familiarity, some senior scientists are active in 
a diplomatic context, but not having that terminology, just consider it work required for delivering the 
project.  
From the perspective of the coordinators, if science is to thrive in a diplomatic context, it is necessary 
to keep the three elements of nation, science and society in balance. This corresponds incidentally, 
to the three pillars of the H2020 programme.  
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In the realm of nation building, the importance 
of EU cohesion programmes is without doubt, 
and recognised by most, but this objective was 
not as highly prioritised by the coordinators as 
might be expected, as one of the younger 
scientists commented; 
“I can imagine in the early days it would be quite 
novel to work with groups from different 
countries and this would have been a real step 
forward… but now it’s very established and I 
think people take it for granted.” (Coordinator, 
Belgium) 
However, the need to improve the EU’s scientific standing in the world is a consistent theme, not only 
among coordinators working within the pillar of Industrial Leadership. It is considered increasingly 
undesirable for example, to be at the mercy of US industry, in areas such as data ownership and 
applications necessary to participate in the Internet of Things. 
As science and technology approaches the market, coordinators must deal with a complex network 
of stakeholders and industry end-users, often required by the call to be included within the 
consortium. Any diplomatic effort is more correctly now called innovation, or economic, than science. 
As Leijten (2017) points out, ‘companies and their representative organisations are becoming 
increasingly important players in the domain of foreign policy.’ Certainly, the evidence demonstrates 
that the big industry players in Pharma and Agriculture are wielding significant power, and 
coordinators are aware that leaving them out of the conversation, even in the earliest developmental 
stages, in no longer an option. As the power increasingly shifts from nations to major industry, the 
most critical interface for science is also shifting. Whereas we have observed a disconnect between 
the coordinators and their national foreign policies, there is much less difficulty for coordinators 
articulating the key drivers and objectives of industry.  
Conclusion and Recommendations 
Science diplomacy is a shared competence, but it is clearly not a level playing field among member 
state when it comes to focus and capability in this area. Van Langenhove (2017) notes this 
unevenness and the lack of strategic vision for science diplomacy at member state level and argues 
for more support from the Commission in developing both strategy and support tools in this field. This 
study suggests that in forming any such strategies, politicians and policy makers who tend to see and 
speak of science diplomacy through a lens of past collaborations and successes, look instead to 
current and emerging scientific practice, new technologies for information and exchange, 
globalisation and the impact of big industry and not to be overlooked, the changing nature of political 
discourse. 
This would significantly advance science as a tool for diplomacy in the EU, but it is still far removed 
from activating science diplomacy within the scientific community and importantly, understanding its 
limits. From the practitioners’ perspective, it is clear that any engagement in diplomatic objectives 
must be approached with both clarity and sensitivity. And in very practical terms, as one coordinator 
pointed out, leading a substantial H2020 project is a big job, to what extent do you also expect them 
to actively participate in diplomacy?  
However, there is significant upside in providing appropriate context and increasing capacity in some 
segments of the scientific community, particularly as science reaches higher TRLs and engages with 
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a multiplicity of policy, industry, government and community stakeholders. Here science and 
technology may make a hard impact in economic and societal terms and awareness of political 
context can increase the likelihood of delivering actionable outcomes.  
There are several recommendations for the Commission that emerge from the research, that would 
improve the ability of scientists to contribute to the policy conversation: 
1. Raise awareness of the political and diplomatic context. Ensure that coordinators have 
access to an appropriate brief regarding any political or diplomatic sensitivities in countries 
in which they may be operating, particularly external to the EU. 
2. Clarify the deliverables; ensure that the call is specific regarding any specific actions or 
outcomes that could contribute to a foreign policy agenda of the EU, or a member state. 
3. Increase transparency and access to the policy making process, so that science can better 
make its contribution.  
4. Improve communication between Commission and member states; optimise the 
opportunities for diplomatic impact by increasing awareness at member state level of the 
major scientific achievements and projects being undertaken in European framework 
programmes.  
Improvement in these areas will not be the complete answer to engaging the scientific community in 
achieving diplomatic objectives but would certainly optimise the opportunities as they present 
themselves. And if greater clarity and ease of process can improve the societal and scientific impact 
of projects, then both science and diplomacy will benefit. 
Science has an important role to play in the relations between nations, within the EU and beyond. The 
desirability of harnessing and directing science for diplomatic purposes is assumed by most 
academics and policy makers, and there is certainly much that can be done at all levels to enhance 
its contribution. The caution to be observed, is that drawing scientists too much into a diplomatic 
agenda or loading projects with diplomatic objectives or overtones will place in jeopardy the very 
neutrality of science that makes it so powerful. Thus, perhaps the most critical recommendation from 
the study, is that in any efforts by the Commission to engage its scientists in diplomatic efforts, the 
halo of neutrality that enables science to function in as a diplomatic tool, and the credibility of science 
and scientists as unbiased experts, must be protected.  
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